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While there seems to be a consensus that political parties remain the sine qua non of western
democracies, the question of under which conditions political parties could be dissolved has also
been gaining significance in European human rights law since the 1990s. An overall assessment
of the cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights (”ECtHR”) and domestic courts of
the member of the Council of Europe suggests there are three categories of political parties faced
with the prospect of dissolution. Part I of this Article describes the first category, the political
parties that have criticized state policies on certain sensitive domestic issues, such as the problems
faced by minority groups (”pro-minority political parties”). Part II deals with the second category,
the so-called anti-secular political parties, which have found no support at the ECtHR. Part III
describes the third category, the parties that had proven links with terrorist organizations and, like
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DISSOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
Olgun Akbulut* 
INTRODUCTION 
While there seems to be a consensus that political parties 
remain the sine qua non of western democracies, the question of 
under which conditions political parties could be dissolved has 
also been gaining significance in European human rights law 
since the 1990s. Before the 1990s, dissolution of a political party 
was known as a Cold-War phenomenon. When the German 
Communist Party submitted an application to the European 
Commission of Human Rights (“Commission”) in 1957, the 
Commission found no difficulty in turning down the application 
on the basis of Article 17 (abuse of right of individual petition) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR” or 
“Convention”).1 According to the Commission, the party’s 
commitment to social and communist order established by 
proletarian revolution and dictatorship placed itself in 
contradiction with democratic ideals.2 Similarly, in the case of X. 
v. Italy, where the applicant sought protection for a fascist 
political movement, the Commission, by referring to the 
legitimate aim to protect democracy, found the application 
inadmissible.3 
 
* Dr. Akbulut (PhD) is an Assistant Professor of Human Rights and Constitutional 
Law at Kadir Has University, Faculty of Law (Istanbul, Turkey). 
1. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
17, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human 
Rights]. 
2. See German Communist Party v. Germany, App. No. 250/57, European 
Commission of Human Rights: Documents and Decisions: 1955–1957, 222–25 (Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. 1957). 
3. See X. v. Italy, App. No. 6741/74, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 83, 83–85 
(1976). 
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Apart from these two political party applications, European 
human rights monitoring has dealt mainly with political speeches 
of individual applicants seeking protection under Article 10 
ECHR (freedom of expression).4 It has been the common 
understanding in Europe that political parties are not prohibited 
in democracies; only criminal behaviors of individual members 
are punished. Therefore, there has not been a common 
European model for the dissolution of political parties.5 
However, the 1990s marked another turning point in European 
human rights law. For the first time in its history, the European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR” or “Court”) had to decide a 
case on the dissolution of a political party in United Communist 
Party v. Turkey.6 Since then, the Court has dealt with twelve cases 
that directly concern the dissolution of political parties.7 
 
4. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 10. 
5. See European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), 
Opinion on the Constitutional and Legal Provisions Relevant to the Prohibition of Political Parties 
in Turkey, 4–5, Op. No. 489/2008, CDL-AD(2009)006 [hereinafter Opinion on Turkey]. 
6. United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1998). 
7. Herri Batasuna v. Spain, App. Nos. 25803/04 & 25817/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 30, 
2009), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=
hbkm&action=html&highlight=25817/04&sessionid=59748173&skin=hudoc-en; Fazilet 
Partisi v. Turkey (Virtue Party), App. No. 1444/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 27, 2006), available 
at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=
hbkm&action=html&highlight=1444/02&sessionid=59748173&skin=hudoc-en; United 
Macedonian Org. Ilinden-PIRIN v. Bulgaria, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1119 (2005); Emek 
Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 39434/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 31, 2005), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=
html&highlight=39434/98&sessionid=59748173&skin=hudoc-en; Democracy and 
Change Party v. Turkey, App. Nos. 39210/98 & 39974/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 26, 2005), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=
html&highlight=39974/98&sessionid=59748173&skin=hudoc-en; Socialist Party of 
Turkey (STP) v. Turkey, App. No. 26482/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 12, 2003), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=
html&highlight=26482/95&sessionid=59748173&skin=hudoc-en; Refah Partisi v. Turkey 
(Welfare Party), 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 269 (2003); Dicle for the Democratic Party (DEP) 
of Turkey v. Turkey, App. No. 25141/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 10, 2002), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=
html&highlight=25141/94&sessionid=59747964&skin=hudoc-en; Yazar v. Turkey, 2002-
II Eur. Ct. H.R. 395 (2002); Freedom and Democracy Party (OZDEP) v. Turkey, 1999-
VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 293 (1999); United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 1 (1998); Socialist Party v. Turkey, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1233 (1998). In nine of 
these cases, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR” or “Court”) found a 
violation, and in two (Welfare Party and Batasuna v. Spain) the Court found the 
dissolution justified. In Virtue Party, the applicants withdrew the case. The ECtHR also 
had to deal with refusal of registration to political parties, ban on political party 
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An overall assessment of the cases decided by the ECtHR 
and domestic courts of the member of the Council of Europe 
suggests there are three categories of political parties faced with 
the prospect of dissolution. Part I of this Article describes the first 
category, the political parties that have criticized state policies on 
certain sensitive domestic issues, such as the problems faced by 
minority groups (“pro-minority political parties”). Part II deals 
with the second category, the so-called anti-secular political 
parties, which have found no support at the ECtHR. Part III 
describes the third category, the parties that had proven links 
with terrorist organizations and, like anti-secular parties, were not 
protected by the ECtHR under the Convention. 
I. PRO-MINORITY POLITICAL PARTIES 
The first political party case that fits into the category of pro-
minority political parties is United Communist Party v. Turkey.8 The 
United Communist Party in Turkey (“UCP”) was formed as a 
political party on June 4, 1990.9 Just ten days later, when the UCP 
was preparing to participate in general elections, the Chief 
Prosecutor of the Republic of Turkey applied to the Turkish 
Constitutional Court (“TCC”) for an order dissolving the UCP.10 
Among others things, the prosecutor accused the party of having 
“carried on activities likely to undermine the territorial integrity 
of the [Turkish] State and the unity of the [Turkish] nation.”11 
The prosecutor mainly cited a chapter of the party’s program 
entitled, “Towards a peaceful, democratic and fair solution for 
the Kurdish problem.”12 A year later, the Constitutional Court 
ordered the dissolution of the UCP on account of the views 
expressed in its program.13 
The 1990s marked the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the 
emergence of new states and, as a result, new minorities in 
 
activities, and cut of financial support for political parties. These three areas do not fall 
under the scope of this Article. 
8. United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1998). 
9. See id. at 7. 
10. See id. at 7–8. 
11. See id. at 8. 
12. See id. at 8–9. 
13. See id. at 9–10. Although other grounds were also invoked by the Turkish 
Constitutional Court (“TCC”) in this case, it was the aim to protect national and 
territorial integrity that provoked the decision for a dissolution. See id. 
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Europe. Encouraged by the political discussions in Europe on 
better protection of minorities, the UCP referred to Kurds as 
“people” and argued against the denial of the rights of, and 
discrimination against, Kurds in Turkey, all of which were 
thought of as awakening Kurdish national consciousness.14 
According to the Turkish Constitutional Court, the party also 
encouraged separatism by describing the state authorities’ 
reaction towards the Kurdish issue as “terror” and by requesting 
constitutional recognition of “the existence of the Kurds,” which 
were considered illegal activities.15 In its judgment, the ECtHR 
noted that the Turkish Constitutional Court had a well-
established jurisprudence, which holds: 
[S]elf-determination and regional autonomy were 
prohibited by the Constitution. . . . In Turkey there were no 
“minorities” or “national minorities”, other than those 
referred to in the Treaty of Lausanne and the friendship 
treaty between Turkey and Bulgaria. . . . Like all nationals of 
foreign descent, nationals of Kurdish origin could express 
their identity, but the Constitution and the law precluded 
them from forming a nation or a minority distinct from the 
Turkish nation.16 
The UCP sued Turkey in Strasbourg upon its dissolution, 
asking the ECtHR to declare that the dissolution of the party 
violated, among others, Articles 10 (freedom of expression) and 
11 (freedom of association) of the ECHR.17 
The Turkish government argued in the case that since the 
ECHR made no mention of political parties, Article 11 on 
 
14. See id. at 8. 
15. See id. at 8–10. 
16. Id. at 10. The Lausanne Treaty is a peace treaty signed on July 24, 1923 after the 
end of World War I between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, 
and the Serb Croat Slovene State on the one hand and Turkey on the other. Treaty of 
Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11. Section III of 
the treaty is dedicated to the “protection of minorities.” See id. arts. 37–45. Only non-
Muslim minorities were recognized as a minority and provided protection; in practice 
this protection only applied to Greek Orthodox, Armenian Christians, and Jews. For 
further information on the Treaty of Lausanne and its application in the Turkish legal 
system, see Baskın Oran, The Minority Concept and Rights in Turkey: The Lausanne Peace 
Treaty and Current Issues, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY 35–56 (Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat 
ed., 2007). With the Treaty of Friendship Between Bulgaria and Turkey, both countries 
recognized minority rights of each others’ citizens. Treaty of Friendship Between 
Bulgaria and Turkey, Protocol A, Oct. 18, 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 127. 
17. See United Communist Party, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13. 
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freedom of association did not apply to political parties.18 
According to the government, the case, being an abuse of the 
right of individual application, should have been declared 
inadmissible under Article 17 of the ECHR.19 
The Court dismissed the government’s preliminary 
objections and ruled that Article 11 of the ECHR applied to the 
present case.20 Article 11 reads: “Everyone has the right to . . . 
freedom of association with others, including the right to form 
and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”21 
Based on the fact that political parties are “a form of association 
essential to the proper functioning of democracy” and in view of 
“the importance of democracy in the Convention system,” the 
Court found no doubt that political parties came within the 
scope of Article 11.22 Special reference to trade unions in this 
formulation, in fact, does not limit the type of association. 
Strasbourg organs23 applied Article 17 only in rare cases in 
which the aim of the offending actions of the applicants had 
been to spread violence or hatred.24 In the present case, the 
Court found no implication in the UCP program that the party 
encouraged the use of violence or pursued racist objectives.25 In 
the Court’s view, political parties cannot be excluded from the 
protection afforded by the Convention “simply because [their] 
activities are regarded by the national authorities as undermining 
the constitutional structures of the State.”26 On the contrary, 
state parties are under positive obligation to give effect to the 
rights enshrined in the Convention at the domestic level.27 
The Court then dealt with the argument of the UCP that the 
dissolution of the party even before having had any political 
activity infringed the party’s freedom of association.28 It should 
be stressed that freedom of association, like freedom of 
 
18. See id. at 14. 
19. See id. at 14–16. 
20. See id. at 16–17. 
21. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 4, art. 11. 
22.  See United Communist Party, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 17. 
23. Strasbourg organs consist of the ECtHR and the now-defunct European 
Commission of Human Rights. 
24. See United Communist Party, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 37–39. 
25. See id. at 38. 
26. Id. at 17. 
27. See id. at 18. 
28. See id. at 18–19. 
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expression, is not an absolute right and can be subjected to 
limitations listed in Article 11.29 On the other hand, according to 
the Court, the limitations set out in Article 11, where political 
parties are concerned, are to be construed strictly, and only 
“convincing and compelling reasons” may justify restrictions on 
the freedom of association of political parties.30 
The Court reiterated some general principles governing the 
area of political activity and pluralist democracy.31 Political 
parties in democratic societies have “an essential role in ensuring 
pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy.”32 
Democracy is evidently a fundamental feature of the European 
public order, and there can be no democracy without 
pluralism.33 In the Court’s jurisprudence, freedom of expression 
is found applicable “not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are 
favorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of 
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.”34 
Notwithstanding “its autonomous role and particular sphere of 
application,” Article 11 must also be interpreted in light of 
Article 10.35 As put forward by the Court, the reason behind the 
link between the two freedoms is the fact that the activities of 
political parties form part of a collective exercise of freedom of 
expression.36 
Further elaborations on the concept of democracy made the 
Court consider one of the principal characteristics of democracy, 
 
29. See id. at 19. Article 11 of the ECHR states: 
  Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions 
for the protection of his interests. 
  No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than 
such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful 
restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of 
the police or of the administration of the State. 
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 11. 
30. United Communist Party, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 22. 
31. See id. at 17, 18, 20–22. 
32. Id. at 20. 
33. See id. at 20–21. 
34. Id. at 21. 
35. See id. at 20; see also European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 
10. 
36. See United Communist Party, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20–21. 
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namely the possibility it offers to a state to solve problems 
through dialogue even when the problems are irksome.37 From 
here the Court concluded that “there could be no justification 
for hindering a political group solely because it seeks to debate in 
public [the problems] of part of the State’s population and to 
take part in the nation’s political life in order to find . . . 
solutions [to them].”38 Therefore, the dissolution of a political 
party that seeks to open a political debate, regardless of whether 
it challenges the state ideology and structure, is a drastic measure 
in a pluralist democracy. 
By 2005, the ECtHR had dealt with seven more cases where 
the applicant parties had discussed possible solutions to Turkey’s 
Kurdish issue at the domestic level and were therefore dissolved 
by the Turkish Constitutional Court.39 In all of them, the Court 
found a violation of the Convention rights.40 
In 2005, a Macedonian minority group in Bulgaria sought 
remedy in Strasbourg.41 The UMO Ilinden-PIRIN, a political 
party founded on February 28, 1998 and based in southwestern 
Bulgaria (in an area known as the “Pirin region” or “the 
geographic region of Pirin Macedonia”), was declared 
 
37. See id. at 27. 
38. Id. at 57. Although the Court in this case tries to stress the importance of 
democracy in the Convention regime, no legal definition is given to the political 
concept of “democracy” in the case law. See generally id. 
39. See, e.g., Emek Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 39434/98, ¶¶ 8, 14 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
May 31, 2005), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=39434/98&sessionid=
59748173&skin=hudoc-en; Democracy and Change Party v. Turkey, App. Nos. 39210/98 
& 39974/98, ¶¶ 7–12 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 26, 2005), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=
html&highlight=39974/98&sessionid=59748173&skin=hudoc-en; Socialist Party of 
Turkey v. Turkey, App. No. 26482/95, ¶¶ 31–35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 12, 2003); Dicle for 
the Democratic Party of Turkey v. Turkey, App. No. 25141/94, ¶¶ 37–42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Dec. 10, 2002), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp? item=
1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=25141/94&sessionid=59747964&skin=hudoc-
en; Yazar v. Turkey, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 395, 402–04; Freedom and Democracy Party v. 
Turkey, 1999-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 293, 301–02; Socialist Party v. Turkey, 1998-III Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 1233, 1238, 1240–41, 1245. 
40. See, e.g., Emek Partisi, App. No. 39434/98, ¶¶ 29–30; Democracy and Change 
Party, App. Nos. 39210/98 & 39974/98, ¶¶ 26–27; Socialist Party of Turkey, App. No. 
26482/95, ¶¶ 50–51; Dicle for the Democractic Party of Turkey, App. No. 25141/94, ¶¶ 
65–66; Yazar, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 415; Freedom and Democracy Party, 1999-VIII Eur. 
Ct. H.R. at 317; Socialist Party, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1239. 
41. United Macedonian Org. Ilinden-PIRIN v. Bulgaria, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1119 
(2005). 
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unconstitutional and, as a result, was dissolved by the Bulgarian 
Constitutional Court (“BCC”) on February 29, 2000.42 Although 
the party was founded in 1998, it was finally registered by the 
Sofia City Court on February 12, 1999 upon making necessary 
changes in its constitution.43 Similar to the UCP case, after just a 
short time (ten days after notice of the registration judgment was 
published), sixty-one members of the Bulgarian Parliament 
requested the BCC to declare the UMO Ilinden-PIRIN 
unconstitutional.44 
According to the members of parliament (“MPs”) who 
requested that the BCC declare the party unconstitutional, the 
party’s ultimate goal was an independent Macedonian state, 
formed through the secession of Pirin Macedonia from 
Bulgaria.45 The facts in the case were very similar to those in the 
UCP case. The party had asked for full cultural, political, and 
economic autonomy for the Macedonian minority; withdrawal of 
Bulgarian troops from the region; establishment of a 
Macedonian Orthodox Church independent of the Bulgarian 
Orthodox Church; and recognition of unique folklore, culture, 
traditions, and individuality of the Macedonian people.46 The 
party printed a map of Macedonia featuring territories belonging 
to Bulgaria and Greece and also issued a memorandum calling 
the situation of Macedonians in Bulgaria as “modern-day 
genocide.”47 Relying on Article 11, paragraph two of the ECHR, 
the BCC ruled, “There is no doubt that an activity aimed against 
the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bulgaria imperils its 
national security.”48 Nevertheless, the interpretation and 
application of the limitation clauses of freedom of association in 
paragraph two of Article 11 by the BCC contradicts the case law 
of the ECtHR. The BCC, without trying to explain the scope of 
the right recognized in the first paragraph, attempted to give a 
wide application to the limitation clauses listed in the second 
paragraph.49 
 
42. Id. at 1121, 1123. 
43. See id. at 1121–22. 
44. See id. 
45. See id. at 1122. 
46. See id. at 1124–25. 
47. See id. at 1124. 
48. See id. at 1127. 
49. See id. at 1127, 1133. 
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The UMO Ilinden-Pirin, like other political parties, failed 
before the domestic courts and sought redress in Strasbourg by 
arguing that neither its activities nor the activities of its leaders 
and members suggested hostility towards a democratic form of 
government, and that a State’s territorial integrity was open to 
debate like any other issue of public concern unless it made any 
calls for the use of violence.50 Whereas the party built its defense 
in Strasbourg on the previous case law of the ECtHR, the 
Bulgarian government in its defense used the same arguments 
that were used by the Turkish government, which were already 
found unjustifiable for a measure like the dissolution of a 
political party in a pluralist democracy. 
Unlike the previous cases on the dissolution of political 
parties, the parties in the UMO-Ilinden Prin case did not dispute 
that Article 11 is applicable to political parties.51 Therefore, the 
ECtHR went on to discuss the necessity of the dissolution in a 
democratic society.52 According to the Court, the BCC did not 
consider whether the party’s constitution and program 
conformed with the constitution; rather it relied on “certain 
statements and activities of the Party’s leaders and members, 
both before and after the Party’s founding.”53 In this connection, 
the Court stated that the incidents referred to by the BCC were 
“rallies, speeches, press conferences, letters or maps, in which 
members of the . . . Party or of its predecessor organizations had 
stated that there existed a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and 
that the Pirin region was not part of Bulgaria, and had made 
certain peaceful demands in that respect.”54 In the view of the 
ECtHR, elements of exaggeration and provocativeness included 
in the party’s declarations and speeches of its leading members 
do not automatically amount to a pressing social need in a 
democracy for excluding the party from the political life through 
the measure of dissolution.55 
In both cases against Turkey and Bulgaria, political parties 
touched upon thorny issues such as autonomy, federalism, self-
determination, freedom of minority institutions, and suppression 
 
50. See id. at 1129. 
51. See id. at 1132. 
52. See id. at 1133–35. 
53. Id. at 1134. 
54. Id. 
55. See id. at 1135. 
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of the minority culture and language. However, nothing like 
propagating or taking recourse to violence was found in the party 
programs or in the speeches of the leading members. In these 
cases, the ECtHR settled a case law which suggests that harboring 
separatist views, no matter how disturbing they could be for the 
state and the society in general, should be protected by the 
Convention system and, consequently, by the domestic legal 
systems of the contracting parties. 
II. ANTI-SECULAR POLITICAL PARTIES 
The European Court of Human Rights has dealt with two 
dissolution cases concerning anti-secular political parties. Both 
cases, submitted from Turkey, required the Court to elaborate 
further on the limitations of political parties under the ECHR. 
The first applicant was the Welfare Party (“WP”), which was 
founded on July 19, 1983.56 The WP took part in a number of 
elections between 1983 and 1996.57 In the general elections held 
on December 24, 1995, the Party managed to secure twenty-two 
percent of the votes, which made it the party with the largest 
percentage of votes in the country.58 As a result of the general 
elections of 1995, the Party gained 158 of the then-450 seats in 
the Grand National Assembly.59 In the local elections of 
November 1996, the party received about thirty-five percent of 
the total votes cast.60 Whereas the WP supporters saw this victory 
as a transformation towards real democracy, the secular circles 
interpreted the WP’s growing political power as a revolt against 
the secular character of the Turkish Republic.61 
The chief prosecutor of the Republic of Turkey applied to 
the Turkish Constitutional Court on May 21, 1997 for the 
dissolution the WP on the grounds that the Party had become 
the center of activities against the republican principle of 
secularism.62 The TCC ordered the dissolution of the WP on 
 
56. Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 269, 275 (2003). 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. 
60. Id. 
61. For further details, see M. Hakan Yavuz, Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) 
Party in Turkey, 30 COMP. POL. 63, 76 (1997). 
62. See Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 276. 
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January 16, 1998,63 when the party had been ruling the country in 
a coalition government with a center-right party for eighteen 
months.64 This case has been the most important one in 
comparison to the previous dissolution cases decided by the TCC 
because it involved a ruling party; even those constitutional 
scholars who are not associated with holding liberal views stated 
that the dissolution process against a ruling party is 
unthinkable.65 
In its case before the ECtHR, Turkey used acts, facilities, and 
speeches of the Party’s representatives as pieces of evidence to 
prove the WP’s anti-secular nature: 
1. The WP’s leaders condoned violence in order to set up a 
theocratic regime. The leader of the WP made the following 
speech on April 13, 1994, to the party group in the Parliament: 
The second important point is this: Refah [the WP] will 
come to power and a just [social] order [adil dozen] will be 
established. The question we must ask ourselves is whether 
this change will be violent or peaceful; whether it will entail 
bloodshed. I would have preferred not to have to use those 
terms, but in the face of all that, in the face of terrorism, and 
so that everyone can see the true situation clearly, I feel 
obliged to do so. Today Turkey must take a decision. The 
Welfare Party will establish a just order, that is certain. [But] 
will the transition be peaceful or violent; will it be achieved 
harmoniously or by bloodshed? The sixty million [citizens] 
must make up their minds on that point.66 
An MP of the WP addressed to the public: “If you attempt to 
close down the ‘İmam-Hatip’ theological colleges while the 
Welfare Party is in government, blood will flow. It would be worse 
than in Algeria. I too would like blood to flow.”67 
2. The WP promoted Sharia. One of the MPs of the WP 
made the following speeches in public meetings: “[T]he army 
says: ‘We can accept it if you’re a supporter of the PKK, but a 
 
63. See id. at 279. 
64. See id. at 275–76. 
65. See Erdoğan Teziç, Siyasi Partiler Yasasi Tartişma Toplantilari Dizisi [Seminar on 
the Law on Political Parties] 50 (TüSİAD, May 1997). 
66. See Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 282 (quoting Mr. Necmettin Erbakan, 
Welfare Party chairman). 
67. See id. at 284 (quoting Mr. Ibrahim Halil Celik, Welfare Party MP for the 
province of Şanlıurfa). 
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supporter of sharia, never.’ Well you won’t solve the problem 
with that attitude. If you want the solution, it’s sharia.”68 
Another stated: 
Have you considered to what extent the Koran is applied in 
this country? I have done the sums. Only 39% [of the rules] 
in the Koran are applied in this country. Six thousand five 
hundred verses have been quietly forgotten. . . . Allah asked 
all His prophets to fight for power. . . . I tell you, if I had as 
many heads as I have hairs on my head, even if each of those 
heads were to be torn from my shoulders for following the 
way of the Koran, I would not abandon my cause. . . . The 
question Allah will ask you is this: ‘Why, in the time of the 
blasphemous regime, did you not work for the construction 
of an Islamic State?’ Erbakan and his friends want to bring 
Islam to this country in the form of a political party. The 
prosecutor understood that clearly.69 
3. The WP suggested establishing a multiplicity of legal 
systems, which, according to the TCC, led to discrimination 
based on religious beliefs.70 The leader of the WP, on March 23, 
1993, made the following speech to the National Assembly: 
“[Y]ou shall live in a manner compatible with your beliefs.” 
We want despotism to be abolished. There must be several 
legal systems. The citizen must be able to choose for himself 
which legal system is most appropriate for him, within a 
framework of general principles. Moreover, that has always 
been the case throughout our history. In our history there 
have been various religious movements. Everyone lived 
according to the legal rules of his own organisation, and so 
everyone lived in peace. Why, then, should I be obliged to 
live according to another’s rules? . . . The right to choose 
one’s own legal system is an integral part of the freedom of 
religion.71 
 
68. See id. at 283 (quoting Mr. Hassan Huseyin Ceylan, Welfare Party MP for the 
province of Ankara). 
69. See id. at 282–83 (quoting Mr. Sevki Yilmaz, Welfare Party MP for the province 
of Rize). 
70. See id. at 280–82. 
71. See id. at 281 (quoting WP Chairman Necmettin Erbakan). Erbakan also said: 
The plurality of legal systems advocated by Mr Necmettin Erbakan in his 
speeches had its origin in the practice introduced in the first years of Islam by 
the “Medina Agreement,” which had given religious minorities—the Jewish 
and polytheistic communities—the right to live according to their own legal 
systems, not according to Islamic law. On the basis of the Medina Agreement, 
  
58 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:46 
The TCC stated it would undermine the legislative and judicial 
unity in the country if each religious movement was allowed to 
declare and apply the law they chose in their civil matters.72 
4. The WP promoted the Islamic headscarf. In his speech of 
December 14, 1995, before the general election, the WP’s leader 
said in public, “[University] chancellors are going to retreat 
before the headscarf when Refah [the WP] comes to power.”73 
5. The WP prime minster, during the coalition government, 
entertained leaders of some religious sects who attended in their 
religious vestments, in the secular area of the PM’s official 
residence, which is understood as assuring them state support of 
the freedom to wear religious garb. 
6. During the government of the WP, regulations were bent 
to allow special working hours in public settings to accommodate 
the devout fasting during the holy month of Ramadan. 
7. The rhetoric and actions of the WP leaders led the 
Turkish state to identify the party as a center for activities to 
disintegrate the state.74 
 
some Islamist intellectuals and politicians had proposed a model of peaceful 
social co-existence under which each religious group would be free to choose 
its own legal system. 
Id. A similar system, known as the Millet system (which may be called “cultural 
autonomy” with today’s terms), was applied in Ottoman Turkey for non-Muslim 
communities. Id. For further information on the Ottoman Millet system, see 
PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 29 
(1991). 
72. Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 281–82. 
73. See id. at 281 (quoting WP Chairman Necmettin Erbakan). Upon an application 
submitted by a university student who had been refused access to education by the 
university administration for wearing the Islamic headscarf, the ECtHR had an 
opportunity to deal with the problem of the prohibition of veiling for female university 
students in Turkey. See generally Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175 (2005). The 
ECtHR, like the highest domestic court in Turkey, found neither a violation of religious 
rights and freedoms nor a violation of the right to education. See id.; see also Jill Marshall, 
Conditions for Freedom? European Human Rights Law and the Islamic Headscarf Debate, 30 
HUM. RTS. Q. 631, 633 n.5 (2008). 
74. See Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 279–86. In addition to the above 
speeches made by representatives of the Welfare Party, both the Turkish Constitutional 
Court and the European Court of Human Rights gave unnecessary importance to some 
statements of the WP’s MPs that do not have much meaning and logic. See, e.g., id. at 284 
(“If they piss into the wind they’ll get their faces wet. If anyone attacks me I will strike 
back. I will fight to the end to introduce sharia.” (quoting Mr. Ibrahim Halil Celik, 
Welfare Party MP for the province of Sanhurfa)); id. at 285 (“A State without television 
is not a State. If today, with your leadership, you wished to create a State, if you wanted 
to set up a television station, you would not even be able to broadcast for more than 
twenty-four hours. Do you believe it is as easy as that to create a State? That’s what I told 
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The ECtHR evaluated the alleged anti-secular activities in 
the following manner: First, the Court interpreted the argument 
that the WP’s policy to set up a plurality of legal systems led to 
discrimination based on religious beliefs and undermined the 
legal and judicial unity in Turkey.75 The ECtHR took the view 
that such a societal model based on a plurality of legal systems 
cannot be considered compatible with the Convention system for 
two reasons76: (1) the system would exclude the state’s role as the 
guarantor of individual rights and freedoms “since it would 
oblige individuals to obey, not rules laid down by the State in the 
exercise of its above-mentioned functions, but static rules of law 
imposed by the religion concerned,”77 and (2) such a system 
“would undeniably infringe the principle of non-discrimination 
between individuals as regards their enjoyment of public 
freedoms, which is one of the fundamental principles of 
democracy.”78 
Next, the ECtHR commented on the place of Sharia under 
the Convention regime.79 The ECtHR made it very clear that a 
propagation of Sharia by a political party has no room under 
European human rights protection: 
 Like the Constitutional Court, the Court considers that 
sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules 
laid down by religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such 
as pluralism in the political sphere or the constant evolution 
of public freedoms have no place in it. The Court notes that, 
when read together, the offending statements, which contain 
explicit references to the introduction of sharia, are difficult 
to reconcile with the fundamental principles of democracy, 
as conceived in the Convention taken as a whole. It is 
difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human 
rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on 
sharia, which clearly diverges from Convention values, 
particularly with regard to its criminal law and criminal 
procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way 
 
them ten years ago. I remember it now. Because today people who have beliefs, an 
audience and a certain vision of the world, have a television station of their own, thanks 
be to God. It is a great event.” (quoting Mr. Necmettin Erbakan)). 
75. See id. at 309–10. 
76. See id. at 310. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. 
79. See id. at 310–12. 
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it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in 
accordance with religious precepts. . . . In the Court’s view, a 
political party whose actions seem to be aimed at introducing 
sharia in a State party to the Convention can hardly be 
regarded as an association complying with the democratic 
ideal that underlies the whole of the Convention.80 
Third, the Court evaluated the possibility of recourse to 
violence as a political method by the WP members.81 One of the 
main arguments of the WP’s representatives before the ECtHR 
was the fact that recourse to violence had never been the party’s 
method of reaching its aims. To substantiate their argument, the 
WP’s representatives referred to the party program, which has no 
references to such means. In fact, in addition to the party 
program, no other public documents of the party nor the 
election manifesto advocated violence or Sharia. Like the TCC, 
the ECtHR simply disregarded these facts and demonstrated a 
skeptical approach by indicating that religious fundamentalists 
have been able to seize political power in certain states and have 
had the opportunity to set up the model Islamic society.82 
As an additional penalty, the Constitutional Court also 
stripped six leading WP members, whose words and deeds had 
caused the party’s dissolution, of their membership in the 
Parliament.83 They were also banned for a period of five years 
from becoming founding members, ordinary members, leaders, 
administrators, or auditors of any other political party in 
Turkey.84 
This author does not feel as competent as the ECtHR to 
comment on what Sharia is about, but it could be reminded that 
there are controversies, disagreements, and extremely conflicting 
views about Sharia. Further, Kevin Boyle points out the risk that 
the hostile formulations of Islam employed by the ECtHR will 
neither promote understanding nor help to distinguish between 
 
80. See id. at 312. Yigal Mersel suggests that courts, including the ECtHR, should 
not only ban political parties that are non-democratic externally, but should also 
consider the lack of internal democracy as a major factor in party dissolution. See Yigal 
Mersel, The Dissolution of Political Parties: The Problem of Internal Democracy, 4 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 84 (2006). 
81. See Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 314–15. 
82. See id. at 312. 
83. See id. at 286. 
84. See id. 
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the interpretation of Islam by extremists and the beliefs of the 
millions of moderate Muslims. Doing so has become much more 
important since 9/11, due to the increase in prejudice against 
Islam in Europe.85 In addition, it should not be the role of courts, 
especially a human rights court, to supply information about 
religion regardless of whether it is positive or negative. 
With the case of the WP, the ECtHR, a supranational human 
rights monitoring organ, approved the dissolution of a political 
party for the first time in the history of human rights. The case 
took its place in the list of key judgments of the ECtHR. It 
provoked serious discussions on the limitations of political 
parties in pluralist democracies. Whether the Court is fully 
convinced that pluralist democracy and rule of law could only 
have been protected with the approval of the dissolution of the 
Welfare Party still remains an unanswered question. At the 
theoretical level, the Court ruled that a political party that fails to 
respect the principle of secularism will not enjoy religious 
freedoms.86 In this conjunction, Koçak and Örücü argued that 
the remarks of the TCC on secularism have had an impact on the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.87 Nonetheless, it was interesting to 
see how the ECtHR distanced itself from the issue of whether the 
Welfare Party posed a real threat to secularism, democracy, rule 
of law, and human rights in Turkey. 
Although the ECtHR justified an absolute ban on the WP, 
one could simply argue that the timing of the prosecution in 
Turkey to move on the Welfare case was too early to warrant 
action, since it was mainly the party leader’s rhetoric rather than 
explicit actions of the party that prompted the case. Even the 
Turkish government before the ECtHR accepted that the party 
had never exercised power alone and therefore never had an 
opportunity to put into practice its plan of setting up a theocratic 
state. Only if the WP had been the sole party in power could it 
have been capable of implementing its policies and put an end to 
democracy. However, regardless of whether a state is run by a 
non-secular party like the WP, the state’s responsibility under 
 
85. See Kevin Boyle, Human Rights, Religion and Democracy: The Refah Party Case, 1 
ESSEX HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 13–14 (2004). 
86. See Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 302. 
87. Mustafa Koçak & Esin Örücü, Dissolution of Political Parties in the Name of 
Democracy: Cases from Turkey and the European Court of Human Rights, 9 PUB. L. 399, 423 
(2003). 
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international human rights law would end only if the state 
concerned withdraws from the Convention system88 or ceases to 
be a member of an international organization, such as Council of 
Europe. Regardless of whether the application of the religious 
rules contradicts human rights norms, the state should take the 
initiative and apply secular norms. 
For the ECtHR, national authorities are in a better position 
to decide the appropriate timing for interference, and state 
parties do not need to wait until the political party comes to 
power to embark on an action to destroy democracy and peace 
by tabling bills at the parliament.89 The justifications of the 
ECtHR to uphold the dissolution feeds the idea that the system 
of Sharia was so close to being implemented that the TCC, by 
acting just in time, saved the secular democracy in Turkey. Boyle, 
on the other hand, who seems much more knowledgeable than 
the ECtHR about the political and legal system of Turkey, deems 
this picture unrealistic and adds that the Justice and 
Development Party, the successor to the WP, made more efforts 
toward democratic progress than any of the secular parties which 
have held power in the country.90 
Where the Court stressed in United Communist Party v. Turkey 
that “[i]n determining whether a necessity within the meaning of 
Article 11 § 2 exists, the Contracting States have only a limited 
margin of appreciation,” it granted a wide margin of 
appreciation to Turkish authorities when deciding the level of 
the threat posed by the party to the democratic political life in 
Turkey.91 One could call the wide margin of appreciation 
provided to Turkish authorities in this case a protection of local 
 
88. State parties to the ECHR, for instance, have a right to withdraw under Article 
58. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 58. This is not to say 
that a state’s human rights obligations would cease entirely if it did withdraw. It would 
still be obliged to respect those human rights recognized by customary international law 
(“CIL”); however, whether any of the political rights discussed in this Article are in fact 
protected by CIL remains an open question. 
89. See Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 298, 304, 305, 307.  
90. See Boyle, supra note 85, at 12. 
91. See United Communist Party v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 22 (1998). 
Referring to ECtHR’s previous case law, namely the Welfare Party judgment, the 
Bulgarian government in the UMO Ilinden-Pirin case indicated that states enjoy a wide 
margin of appreciation in choosing the means to restrict the freedom of association. See 
United Macedonian Org. Ilinden-PIRIN v. Bulgaria, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1119, 1131 
(2005). 
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jurisdiction, or in other words, multiculturalism. However, given 
the circumstances of the case, the Court settled on cultural 
singularism in an age of multiculturalism. As Scheinin argues: 
Instead of excluding, as a matter of principle, the 
diversification of rights and obligations in a multicultural 
society according to religious affiliation and through the 
delegation of certain regulatory authority to religious 
entities, a human rights approach should look at the 
concrete modalities and safeguards of such delegation. If a 
political party declares as its aim to change legislation, 
through democratic means, so that room would be given to 
religious law, this should be seen as an opening for a 
discussion where human rights certainly have a role to play 
in designing the limits and safeguards necessitated by such 
delegation of authority. But to declare that such a proposal 
already makes the party program in question incompatible 
with human rights goes, in the view of the present author, 
too far and might leave too little room for multiculturality.92 
The WP representatives asked before both the TCC and the 
ECtHR to apply the “clear and present danger” test developed by 
the US Supreme Court, but neither of the courts found it 
necessary to apply.93 The ECtHR insisted on the “clear and 
imminent danger” criteria as developed in its own case law.94 
According to the ECtHR, state parties are under a positive 
obligation to secure the rights and freedoms listed in the 
Convention to persons under its jurisdiction.95 To this end, state 
parties are empowered with the power of “preventive 
intervention,” which totally rejects the “present danger” test of 
the US Supreme Court.96 
The dissolution of the WP was unanimously upheld by the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR.97 However, in the previous 
chamber judgment, three out of seven judges submitted a 
 
92. Martin Scheinin, How to Resolve Conflicts Between Individual and Collective Rights?, 
in RETHINKING NON-DISCRIMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 219, 230 (Martin Scheinin 
& Reetta Toivanen eds., 2004). 
93. See Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 277, 306. 
94. See id. at 305–06. 
95. See id. 
96. See id. at 277, 305–06. 
97. See id. at 316. 
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dissenting opinion.98 They did not deduce from the evidence that 
the WP’s actions justified the dissolution. In their joint dissenting 
opinion, which is almost as long as the majority opinion, they 
argued, inter alia, that many speeches of the WP representatives 
in question were made long before the party came to power and, 
therefore, afforded no proper basis for the dissolution.99 Other 
actions when the Party was in power cannot be considered an 
imminent threat to the secular system in Turkey since the party 
was bound with the program of the coalition government.100 
Therefore, the party did not attempt to implement a non-secular 
system, nor did it take any steps to realize political aims that were 
incompatible with the Convention norms, nor engage in acts of 
violence or religious hatred, nor in any other manner threaten 
the legal and democratic order.101 They remarked that in this 
case a blunt measure of dissolving a party was taken as an 
alternative to penalization of responsible individuals.102 
When the dissolution case was pending before the TCC, MPs 
of the Welfare Party established another political party, the 
Virtue Party (“VP”), as a substitute for the Welfare Party on 
December 17, 1997.103 By May 7, 1999, the Chief Prosecutor of 
the Republic applied to the TCC for the dissolution of the VP as 
well.104 The TCC, in its judgment delivered on June 22, 2001, had 
no difficulty closing down the VP on the grounds of its activities 
against the republican principle of secularism.105 The VP was 
dissolved mainly because its members supported the wearing of 
the Islamic headscarf at public institutions, including universities 
and the Turkish Parliament. The VP had, in fact, nominated a 
female candidate wearing a headscarf, who was elected in 1999, 
 
98. Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) v. Turkey, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 92 (2002) 
(Fuhrmann, J., Loucaides, J., & Bratza, Sir Nicolas J., dissenting). 
99. See id. at 98. 
100. See id. at 97. 
101. See id. at 94, 97–98. 
102. Id.; see Boyle, supra note 85, at 11 (arguing that statements made a number of 
years before the party came to power were classified as meeting an immediate danger for 
the implementation of such a policy). See generally LOUKIS LOUCAIDES, AN ALTERNATIVE 
VIEW ON THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
COLLECTION OF SEPARATE OPINIONS (1998–2007) 299–313 (Françoise Tulkens et al. 
eds., 2008). 
103. See REGISTRY, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INFORMATION NOTE NO. 
76 ON THE CASE-LAW OF THE COURT 25. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. 
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entered into Parliament, and swore the oath with her headscarf 
on.106 
Unlike the WP, the VP did not have any chances of gaining 
enough votes to come to power. None of its members used 
language referring to Sharia, the jihad (holy war), or violence. 
The party members declared no support for plurality of legal 
systems or any other form of religious rules. Bearing all this 
information in mind, the VP leaders were confident about a 
favorable ruling from Strasbourg when they submitted their 
application to the ECtHR against Turkey. The ECtHR found the 
application admissible;107 it even held a hearing in Strasbourg at 
the Human Rights Palace of the Council of Europe.108 However, 
representatives of the Virtue Party lost their faith in the ECtHR. 
Hence, less than two months after the hearing took place, they 
sent a declaration to the Court for the withdrawal of the case.109 
In their declaration, the VP representatives argued that 
European human rights protection is closed to believers of 
Islam.110 Basing their arguments on the previous cases decided by 
the ECtHR, they expressed that the hypothetical interpretations 
and the practice of the Court in cases such as the WP dissolution 
case and the headscarf case111 constitute a contradiction and a 
double standard, which is a violation of the prohibition of 
discrimination by the Court itself.112 Having concluded that the 
Court was prejudiced against Muslim applicants, they decided to 
withdraw the case.113 Pursuant to the withdrawal, the ECtHR 
decided on April 27, 2006, to strike the case from its docket.114 
This withdrawal relieved the ECtHR of the task of applying its 
previous restrictive remarks on Islam and anti-secularism to a 
 
106. See Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Chamber Hearing: 
Kavakci v. Turkey, Fazilet Partisi and Kutan v. Turkey, Silay v. Turkey, and Ilicak v. 
Turkey (Apr. 5, 2007) (on file with author). 
107. Virtue Party, App. No. 1444/02, ¶ 6 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 27, 2006), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=
html&highlight=1444/02&sessionid=59748173&skin=hudoc-en. 
108. Id. ¶ 7. 
109. Id. ¶ 9. 
110. See id. 
111. Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175 (2005). 
112. See id. 
113. See id. 
114. See id. at 176. 
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party that only asked for the freedom to let female university 
students and public servants wear a veil. 
In many other cases submitted to the ECtHR concerning the 
political activities of political parties, the Court stressed the 
importance of recourse to violence and a respect for Convention 
rights when designating limits for political parties.115 For the 
Court, the protection of opinions and the freedom to express 
them is one of the objectives of the freedoms of assembly and 
association enshrined in Article 11.116 That applies all the more 
in relation to political parties in view of their essential role in 
ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy.117 
The Court further ruled: 
In any event, the Court cannot find any statements . . . 
despite the critical and sometimes hostile language used, 
that might reasonably be construed as a call for the use of 
violence for political ends or as a policy in breach of the 
rules of democracy. In this connection, the Court observes 
that . . . [the] applicant stated that he was in favor of free, 
multi-party elections and a political system based on respect 
for others and their political opinions . . . .118 
III. POLITICAL PARTIES WITH LINKS TO A TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATION 
The year 2009 marked another turning point in the history 
of human rights in Europe. The world had already experienced 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent bombings in 
Bali, Istanbul, London, and Madrid. In the instant case of Herri 
Batasuna v. Spain, the ECtHR dealt with an application of a 
political party that was dissolved after having been found guilty of 
supporting terrorism.119 
The Herri Batasuna, an electoral coalition, and the 
Batasuna, a political party, were founded on March 1, 1979, and 
 
115. See, e.g., Partidul Comunistilor v. Romania, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 209, 220 
(2005); Yazar v. Turkey, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 395, 412 (2002). 
116. See Partidul Comunistilor v. Romania, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 219–20. 
117. See id. at 220. 
118. Id. at 222. 
119. See generally Herri Batasuna v. Spain, App. Nos. 25803/04 & 25817/04 (Eur. 
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May 3, 2001, respectively, in Spain as the political wing of Euskadi 
Ta Askatasuna (“ETA”), the Basque separatist organization.120 
Following the Spanish Parliament’s newly enacted Law on 
Political Parties (“LOPP”),121 Spain’s Attorney General submitted 
a case to the Spanish Supreme Court (“SSC”) on September 2, 
2002, for the dissolution of the applicant parties.122 The aim of 
LOPP was to set out the limitations on political parties when they 
violate rights of citizens by promoting racism or violence. The 
Spanish Parliament prepared the new regulations regarding 
political parties because of the relationship between ETA and 
Herri Batasuna and Batasuna. According to the key provision of 
Article 9 of LOPP, political parties could be declared illegal when 
they repeatedly: (1) violate fundamental rights by promoting, 
justifying, or excusing attacks on the life or dignity of the person 
or the exclusion or persecution of an individual by reason of 
ideology, religion, beliefs, nationality, race, sex, or sexual 
orientation; (2) encourage or enable violence to be used as a 
means to achieve political ends or as a means to undermine the 
conditions that make political pluralism possible; or (3) assist 
and give political support to terrorist organizations with the aim 
of subverting the constitutional order.123 
In applying LOPP, the SSC declared the applicant parties 
illegal and ordered their dissolution on the basis of LOPP on 
March 12, 2003.124 The crux of the Supreme Court’s decision was 
the fact that the applicant parties had strong links with the 
terrorist organization ETA, which put the Batasuna and Herri 
Batasuna under ETA control.125 In other words, the applicant 
parties were working as a satellite organization of the ETA. The 
Supreme Court based its decision on a number of activities 
 
120. See id. ¶¶ 9, 16. 
121. Law on Political Parties art. IX (B.O.E. 2002, 6) (Spain). 
122. See id. ¶ 28. 
123. Id. Paragraph three of Article 9 of the Law on Political Parties (“LOPP”) also 
lists different types of conduct in detail that, when repeated, comprise the conditions set 
forth in the previous paragraph. See id.; see also, Katherine A. Sawyer, Comment, Rejection 
of Weimarian Politics or Betrayal of Democracy?: Spain’s Proscription of Batasuna Under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1531, 1546, 1551 (2003); Leslie 
Turano, Spain: Banning Political Parties as a Response to Basque Terrorism, 1 INT’L J. CONST. 
L. 730, 733 (2003). 
124. See Herri Batasuna, App. Nos. 25803/04 & 25817/04, ¶ 30. 
125. See id. ¶¶ 30, 32. 
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carried out by the representatives of the applicant parties.126 
These activities were found to be instruments for the separatist 
strategy of the terrorist ETA.127 Two appeals submitted to the 
Spanish Constitutional Court against the decisions of the SSC 
were unanimously rejected by the Constitutional Court on 
January 16, 2004.128 
On July 7, 2002, Batasuna’s representative stated in public 
that the party would continue to work and fight legally or 
illegally.129 He also added that their “arms do not tremble 
because they are in a historical moment where nothing could 
force them to abandon their struggle.”130 During a 
demonstration on August 11, 2002, called by Batasuna to support 
ETA prisoners, party leaders were heard shouting slogans such as 
“the struggle is the only way,” “you, the fascists, you are the real 
terrorists,” and “live military ETA.”131 In another press 
conference held by the Batasuna on August 21, 2002, the 
spokesperson criticized the “genocidal strategy of the Spanish 
state” and declared that the Basque people would “organize” and 
“fight.”132 In an interview with a newspaper on August 23, 2002, 
another representative of the Batasuna in the Basque Parliament 
declared ETA an organization that sees the need to use all 
instruments to deal with the state.133 The SSC also underlined the 
fact that in the municipalities run by the Batasuna and on the 
web page of the party, anagrams of an illegal organization was 
posted.134 On many occasions these municipalities incited people 
to fight against the state, state representatives, and other political 
parties. In addition, in many other public meetings, 
representatives, mayors, and leading members of the applicant 
parties declared implicitly or explicitly their support to ETA 
terrorists.135 
 
126. See id. ¶ 34. 
127. See id. ¶ 35. 
128. See id. ¶¶ 44–46. By a decision dated March 12, 2003, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court had already found the new LOPP constitutional. See id. ¶ 20. 
129. See id. ¶ 34. 
130. See id. (author’s translation from French). 
131. See id. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. 
134. See id. 
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Like other political parties dissolved by national courts, 
Herri Batasuna and Batasuna brought their case to the ECtHR.136 
For the representatives of the dissolved political parties, whatever 
action taken by the parties in the political arena should be seen 
as manifestations of freedom of expression. The legal problem 
for the applicants was the fact that their expressions were not 
shared by the state and were therefore interpreted subjectively by 
the domestic courts. For them, the facts attributed to the parties 
did not justify a severe measure of dissolution.137 
In opposition to the applicants’ claims that the activities 
should be analyzed under freedom of expression, the ECtHR 
followed its previous case law on the topic, which suggests that 
the means used to limit rights and freedoms should be legal (i.e., 
proportional and necessary) and comply with fundamental 
democratic principles.138 Sharing the opinions of the domestic 
courts, the ECtHR considered the parties’ links with the terrorist 
organization as a threat to democracy. This led the Court to 
decide that the sanction imposed on the applicants was in 
balance with the reason for interference and met a pressing 
social need, and was therefore necessary in a democratic 
society.139 
The applicant parties’ links to the ETA were not unknown to 
political and legal circles in Spain, Europe, and elsewhere. The 
question was whether democracies should deal with the 
expressions listed above individually on the bases of criminal law 
or whether affiliated institutions should also be subjected to the 
legal process for dissolution. Interpretations of the ECtHR 
decision in Welfare Party v. Turkey encouraged legal actions 
against political parties whose representatives actively supported 
the violent acts of illegal organizations.140 The SCC found that 
the calls to and support for violence by the representatives of the 
Batasuna were more explicit than those by the WP 
representatives.141 
The Batasuna judgment of the ECtHR encouraged the TCC 
to pursue the dissolution of the Kurdish political party, the 
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Democratic Society Party (“DSP”).142 In addition to classic 
arguments used in previous cases in which the party campaigned 
for minority rights, the Chief Prosecutor of the Republic accused 
the party of tolerating and not condemning the violent activities 
of the PKK (a Kurdish armed group placed in the lists of terrorist 
organizations by the European Union and the United States), 
encouraging their perpetrators, and directly and indirectly 
supporting the organization.143 Unlike, the SSC, the TCC did not 
differentiate the speeches of the party members that could be 
considered as supporting violence from those expressions only 
endorsing the political views of the PKK.144 Following the 
dissolution of the party by the TCC in December 2009,145 the 
DSP’s representatives filed a case with the Strasbourg Court,146 
which will give the ECtHR a second chance to further elaborate 
on the limits of political parties that have established links with 
terrorist groups under European human rights law. 
CONCLUSION 
The strict legal regulations in Turkey regarding political 
party dissolution make the country a unique one in Europe. 
Unfortunately, Turkey’s legislation on political parties resembles 
anti-terrorism legislation. The military junta of 1980–1983, as the 
author of the existing law on political parties, designed it in 
response to the question of how to make political parties adhere 
to the 1982 Constitution, which was partly prepared by the junta 
to oppress any non-Turkish nationalist movements. Therefore, 
instead of securing a free space in which political parties could 
enjoy political rights, the law set out comprehensive limitations 
on parties in order to not allow them to challenge state ideology 
as enshrined in the constitution. 
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Between 1968 and 2009, the Turkish Constitutional Court 
closed down twenty-five political parties in Turkey.147 More than 
half of these cases were brought before the TCC from the 1990s 
onwards.148 It is well developed in the country’s political and legal 
culture that the dissolution of political parties serves best to 
suppress political ideas that challenge state ideology. Due to the 
high number of parties faced with the dissolution process, the 
domestic case law is often referred to as a “cemetery for political 
parties.”149 Representatives of the dissolved parties filed eleven 
applications to the European Court of Human Rights. In only 
one of the cases, Welfare Party, did the ECtHR side with the state. 
The WP’s liberal successor, the ruling Justice and 
Development Party, also faced the dissolution process as late as 
2008.150 Despite the fact that the party was very careful to carry 
out activities without using religious rhetoric and thus preferred 
to be named conservative democrats, the TCC declared the 
party’s activities unconstitutional on the grounds that the party 
engaged in activities against the secularism principle of the 
Republic.151 Instead of a permanent dissolution, the TCC 
ordered a one year deprivation of state aid as a penalty.152 This 
non-dissolution conclusion arrived after the Turkish Parliament, 
within the 2001 EU harmonization package, amended relevant 
articles in the constitution to give the TCC an opportunity to 
decide on an alternative penalty instead of permanently 
dissolving the political party.153 Another threshold that was 
introduced in this package was that the voting rules of the TCC 
were changed, introducing the requirement of a three-fifths 
qualified majority (seven out of eleven judges) for dissolution of 
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a political party.154 In the Justice and Development Party case, 
only six judges voted for the dissolution; one vote saved the 
Party’s political life.155 The fascinating aspect of the outcome of 
this case is that Turkey’s strongest political party, which received 
more than forty-six percent of the votes cast in general elections 
held in July 2007 and has been ruling the country since 2002, was 
found unconstitutional by the TCC.156 Yet, the Party is in power 
but still in constitutional limbo. In addition, it was only in late 
December 2009 that the TCC dissolved the Kurdish political 
party, the Democratic Society Party.157 
In fact, the aim and the provisions on the limitations of the 
Turkish law on political parties have not changed. The change in 
2001 was made in the voting rules of the TCC, which asked a 
qualified majority to decide on dissolution, and a new alternative 
penalty—deprivation of state aid—was also introduced. However, 
the list of material limitations on political parties is still so long 
that the Constitutional Court may dissolve any party that 
challenges the state ideology on minorities and secularism. Due 
to the fact that the legislation literally falls short of European 
human rights standards, the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe in its regulations and the Commission of the 
European Union in its annual progress reports on Turkey’s EU 
membership constantly calls on Turkey to make changes in its 
domestic law with an aim to limit the possibility of applying such 
extreme a measure as dissolution. 
Unlike the Turkish legislation, Bulgaria’s new legislation on 
political parties was found clear, straightforward, modern, and 
ambitious by the Venice Commission.158 Regarding political party 
dissolution, the commission criticized the legislation only on two 
procedural points: First, the law empowers both the 
Constitutional Court and the Sofia City Court to dissolve a 
political party. Second, public prosecutors are the only persons 
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who may apply for dissolution.159 In Spain, the competent organ 
for party closure is the Supreme Court, but the party concerned 
has a possibility to appeal the decision of the Supreme Court to 
the Constitutional Court. In Turkey and in many other European 
countries the only competent organ that could rule on the 
dissolution is the constitutional court. In the view of the 
Commission, in a constitutional democracy, the dissolution of a 
political party should not be a matter for ordinary or 
administrative courts; it should be for the constitutional court to 
decide involuntary dissolution.160 
On the second procedural point, the Commission observed 
that the obligation to apply for the dissolution of a party should 
be entrusted to an institution with political legitimacy, not to 
public prosecutors.161 The reason for this view is the political 
nature and consequences of a decision for dissolution. Both in 
Turkey and Bulgaria, the legal competence to initiate a 
dissolution case against a political party is given to public 
prosecutors. In Spain, the procedure can be launched either by 
the government through the state attorney, acting on its own, at 
the request of one of the two chambers of the Parliament, or by 
the Fiscal Ministry acting on its own.162 
The cases on political party dissolutions that were analyzed 
in this Article gave the Strasbourg human rights institutions—the 
European Commission of Human Rights, the European Court of 
Human Rights, and the Venice Commission—a significant 
opportunity to further advance their views on the relationship 
between the freedom of expression, thought, conscience, and 
religion provided in Articles 9 and 10 of the ECHR and the 
freedom of association and the freedom of assembly provided in 
Article 11. 
According to the dissolved political parties, the aim behind 
the dissolution processes was to eliminate political expressions 
and debates on sensitive issues. This was certainly the case in 
Turkey concerning pro-minority political parties. However, in 
Batasuna, the Spanish government successfully presented 
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evidence that separatist political parties do exist in the political 
domain of various autonomous regions of the country and that it 
was only those political parties who support violence that faced 
dissolution. This view was the strongest point of the government 
in the case and was fully shared by the ECtHR. In addition, in 
Zana v. Turkey, where the applicant was a Kurdish intellectual 
and an ex-mayor of a city run by the Kurdish minority party, the 
ECtHR upheld the conviction of the applicant who, in an 
interview, stated, “I support the PKK national movement; on the 
other hand, I am not in favor of massacres. Anyone can make 
mistakes, and the PKK kill women and children by mistake.”163 
Individual expressions or statements made on behalf of the 
political parties in favor of separatism have secured protection in 
Strasbourg, but expressions implicitly or explicitly giving support 
to violence are not tolerated under European human rights law. 
Since the link with a terrorist organization was clear and not even 
denied by the applicants in Batasuna,164 the ECtHR did not have 
much difficulty in ruling that the party posed a threat to 
democracy in Spain. The enjoyment of democratic rights and 
freedoms with an “aim” to replace existing democratic order 
with a non-democratic one has no protection under European 
human rights law. The European human rights platform is closed 
to enemies of democracy provided that they gained significant 
power for the change. 
It is interesting to observe in these cases that a European-
wide human rights court may also use terms such as “secularism,” 
which has totally different meanings in different parts of Europe. 
While the ECtHR in the WP case deprived the political party of 
human rights protection on the basis of its anti-secular activities, 
in its well-established jurisprudence the ECtHR provided full 
protection to the prohibition of abortion and divorce in Catholic 
countries without even arguing that applying such rules that have 
roots in a religion may contradict the principle of secularism.165 
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Yet the protection provided by the ECtHR to anti-secular 
views appears somewhat different from the protection provided 
to separatist views. In Gündüz v. Turkey, the ECtHR gave full 
protection to the anti-secular views of the applicant a leader of a 
religious sect. He was convicted in Turkey for his violent criticism 
of the secular regime by labeling democrats “impious,” 
describing children born of marriages officiated before the 
secular authorities as “bastards,” and calling for the introduction 
of Sharia as a final solution.166 The ECtHR has departed from its 
previous decision by arguing that the anti-secular political party, 
the WP, had potential to seize power and turn against the 
Convention system, but this cannot be the case for an 
individual.167 This indicates that in European human rights law, 
separatist views can be restricted only when they are combined 
with recourse to violence while anti-secular views can be limited if 
there is violent recourse or support for the institutionalization of 
Sharia law. Keeping in mind that political parties have more 
power over the people than they have over an individual, the 
ECtHR endeavors to prevent the existence of such a pro-Sharia 
power embodied in a political party, which is deemed dangerous 
for the application of the Convention at the national level. Thus, 
the recent judgments of the ECtHR are perhaps part of an 
increasing prejudice against Islam in Europe analogous to the 
fear of totalitarianism, which also framed the case law of the 
1950s. 
The ECtHR describes the ECHR as a constitutional 
instrument of the European public order.168 This description lays 
down the necessity of compliance with the Convention system. 
Considering this, the ECHR together with the strong language 
used by the ECtHR against anti-secular political parties, one 
could still ask whether state parties to the Convention could 
tolerate a political party promoting Sharia in their domestic 
jurisdictions. In the view of the present author, Strasbourg 
jurisdiction on this subject should be taken as minimum legal 
standards but not as the ultimate normative rules. The ECtHR, 
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under the margin of appreciation doctrine, allowed certain 
discretion to the states in deciding the appropriate time to take 
action. This means that only when states deem it necessary will 
they apply the ECtHR rulings. If not, as provided by Article 53 
ECHR, European human rights law should not be construed as 
limiting or derogating from wider protection ensured under the 
domestic law of contracting parties. 
Will there be more dissolution of political parties in Europe 
in the near future? In its reports, the Venice Commission of the 
Council of Europe determined that a large number of European 
states have no regulations on party dissolution.169 Even in those 
states which have comprehensive provisions on party dissolution, 
the provisions are narrowly interpreted and rarely invoked. 
Rather, they work as a passive safety tool.170 
The dissolution processes also presented some answers to 
the question of whether banning a political party could serve as a 
method to combat political ideologies that challenge those held 
by the state. In the case of Turkey, while the dissolution of pro-
minority political parties simply paved the way for the birth of 
more radical successors, the dissolution process faced by the anti-
secular parties apparently pushed those parties to the center-
right wing of the political domain. Today’s Kurdish party in 
Turkey, the Peace and Democracy Party (“PDP”), does not hide 
its support for the PKK. In fact, the PDP was founded on the 
ashes of its predecessors, the DSP. On the other hand, both the 
current Justice and Development Party as well as the Happiness 
Party pursue more liberal policies than their predecessors, the 
WP and the VP. They are reluctant to refer to Islamic law at any 
level. 
As a final remark, it should be emphasized that the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR has been the driving force behind 
several positive amendments in domestic legislation regarding 
the limitations on political parties. However, in the view of this 
author, preparatory works for possible new legislation on political 
parties should also take into account the domestic legislation of 
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European democracies and the comments of the supranational 
organizations, i.e., the Council of Europe, the European Union, 
and the Human Rights Committee of the UN, all of which are in 
some ways more liberal in their interpretations than the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
